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Abstract
This paper is an exposition of  Ibn Sina’s concept Wa>jib al-Wuju>d (Necessary
Existence),  a concept of  God derived from or modified out of  Aristotle’s
natural theology. Since it deviates from Aristotle’s philosophy, it considerably
distinct from the Greek philosophical tradition. Unlike Aristotle whose theological
framework departs from physic, Ibn Sina delineates the concept of God from
pure metaphysical approach consisting of ontological and cosmological
arguments. From this delineation Ibn Sina has successfully solved Aristotle’s
problem of God knowledge and change, and that is by positing that God knew
something other than Himself but it does not imply change in His essence since
His knowledge is unbounded by time. Be that as it may, this philosophical concept
is subject to further examination from theological perspectives. However, the
term Wa>jib al-Wuju>d is a key concept for the explication of  the existence of  God,
but the term itself  is not assumption, but the goal to be investigated. Although
Necessary Existence is only ontological concept it is used in his various way of
proving God’s existence, whether in cosmological argument or other argument.
Interestingly, since all depend on the key concept of  ‘necessity’, the proof  that
begins from the causality does not end in the First Cause but on Wa>jib al-Wuju >d,
an end that seems to be incompatible with the beginning.
Tulisan ini adalah sebuah penjelasan tentang konsep Wajib al-Wujud  Ibnu
Sina, yakni sebuah konsep tentang Allah yang bersumber dari teologi natural
Aristoteles. Karena menyimpang dari filsafat Aristoteles, maka konsep ini jauh
berbeda dari tradisi filsafat Yunani. Tidak seperti Aristoteles yang teologinya
berangkat dari kerangka fisik, Ibnu Sina menggambarkan konsep Allah dari
pendekatan metafisik murni yang terdiri dari argumen ontologis dan kosmologis.
Dari penggambaran ini Ibnu Sina telah berhasil memecahkan masalah Aristoteles
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tentang pengetahuan dan perubahan Allah, dan itu adalah dengan memposisikan
bahwa Allah mengetahui sesuatu selain diri-Nya sendiri, tetapi bukan berarti
perubahan dalam hakikat-Nya karena pengetahuan-Nya tak terbatas oleh waktu.
Itu dikarenakan, konsep filosofis ini tergantung pada penelitian lebih lanjut yang
berangkat dari perspektif  teologis. Bagaimanapun, istilah Wajib al-Wujud
merupakan kata kunci untuk menjelaskan keberadaan Tuhan, tetapi istilah ini
sendiri bukanlah asumsi, melainkan tujuan yang akan diselidiki. Kendati demikian
Wajib al-wujud hanya merupakan konsep ontologis yang dalam berbagai caranya
digunakan untuk membuktikan keberadaan Tuhan, apakah dalam argumen
kosmologis atau argumen lainnya. Menariknya, karena semua tergantung pada
konsep kunci ‘wajib’, bukti yang dimulai dari kausalitas tidak berakhir di
Penyebab Pertama melainkan pada Wajib al-Wujud, sebuah akhir yang tampaknya
tidak sesuai dengan awal.
Keywords: Necessary existence, possible existence, ontological arguments,
cosmological argument, nature of  God.
Introduction
W
a >jib al-Wuju >d is a term coined by Ibn Sina to establish the
proof for the existence of God. Since this concept is of Ibn
Sina’s origin, Davidson regards him as the first philosopher
who employed the concept of necessary existence to prove the
existence of God. 1 It is a fixed expression and becomes the core of
Ibn Sina’s theology (Ila>hiyya>t) as he reiterates his elaboration in his
various treatises.2 Netton mentions Ibn Sina’s proof for the existence
of Wa >jib al-Wuju >d are four: metaphysical proof from necessity, proof
from movements, proof from causality and proof from ontology.3
But the proof from movement is almost the same as the proof from
1 Davidson, Herbert A, “Avicennas’s Proof of the Existence of God as a Necessarily
Existent Being” , in Islamic Philosophical Theology, ed. Parviz Morewedge, (Albany: SUNY
Press, 1979), p. 169.
2 His long elaboration is to be found in his Kitab al-Najat; his brief and somewhat
obscure presentation is in the Isharat wa al-Tanbihat. The full account of Wajib al-Wujud is
in al-Shifa’ and Danish Nama, in which he tends to be only concentrating on the nature of
Wajib al-Wujud.
3 Netton, Ian Richard, Allah Transcendent, (London: Routledge, 1989).
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causality. Morewedge 4 finds out that the concept of Wa >jib al-Wuju >d
has been used in three ways: ontological, theological and pheno-
menological principles. Morewedge does not mention cosmological
principles for he found that it is analyzed within the context of
ontological principle. However, here I shall concentrate on the concept
of Wa >jib al-Wuju >d based on ontological principles that will include
cosmological principle with additional discussion of His nature.5
Ontological Principles
Ontological argument is an argument in the realm of thought
without assuming the actual existence of anything. It is notable as
being purely a priori as an attempt to prove the existence of God
without using any contingent premise. According to Davidson, in
the history of ontological proof, the term necessary being is used in
two senses: a) Necessary being in the sense of a being, whose existence
is established by a priori, logical necessity. b) Necessary being in the
sense of a being that exists through itself, whose essence contains
sufficient reason for its existence.6 Wa >jib al-Wuju >d in Ibn Sina’s
theology is logical necessity based on an analysis of the concept of
God’s nature in so far as the essence of God in that concept contains
sufficient reason of His existence.
In this principle Ibn Sina examines the Wa >jib al-Wuju >d from
the existence itself, by considering the condition (hal) of being. Ibn
Sina established the existence of the Wa >jib al-Wuju >d from the
consideration of existence in general. This is quite different from the
other general proof for the existence of God like Aristotle; for example,
who considers only one segment of existence, which is God’s creation
and effect, namely motion. Although Ibn Sina’s concept is still within
the Aristotelian tradition, which “examine the existent qua existent
and what belongs to it by virtue of itself”, 7 he brilliantly applied it in
4 Morewedge, Parwiz, Morewedge, Parviz, The Metaphysics of Avicenna (Ibn Sina),
A critical translation-commentary and analysis of the fundamental argument in Avicenna’s
Metaphysica in the Danish Namai, ‘ala’i, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), See
translator commentary pp. 229.
5 For the difference between ontological and cosmological argument, See Simon
Blackburn, Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, (USA: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 85; 269.
6 Davidson, Herbert A, “Avicennas’s Proof”, p. 165.
7 Aristotle, Metaphysics,IV.1.1003a20-21. Cf. Ibn Sina, al-Shifa’: al-Ilahiyyat, vol.1,
eds. Ibrahim Madhkur, Qanawati, Said Zayd, (Cairo: al-Hay’a al-‘Amma li Syu’un al-Matabi’
al-Amiriyya, 1960), p.13.
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different way, that is by limiting his examination only from
metaphysical principle drawn from metaphysics. In contrast, the
proof for the existence of God in Aristotle’s theology is drawn largely
from the argument of Physics.8 For this reason Ibn Sina claimed that
his method is more certain and more exalted (فرشا و قثوأ).9
The distinction of Ibn Sina’s proof from that of Aristotle is
manifest. Aristotle’s proof starts from a set of physical principles,
mainly motion, while motion in place underlies all other kinds of
change.10 Everything moved have the cause of their motions outside
themselves;11 nothing can maintain itself in motion unless it is
continuously moved by an agent;12 only circular motion is continuous
and eternal;13 and only an infinite force can maintain the heavens in
motion for an infinite time.14 From all those principles Aristotle came
to his final analysis that there must exist the unmoved mover, which
is the only cause of the motion in the universe.15 Here the existence
of God is identified from the physical phenomena and drawn from
physical principles. Ibn Sina, in contrast, does not start his proof
from physical phenomena, but from the very existence of the
universe. He left aside all the physical argument leading up to
Aristotle Unmoved Mover and begins with a fresh concept by
analyzing the existent of necessity or as he call is Wa >jib al-Wuju >d
(Necessary Existent). This, certainly, requires less premises and, as
Ibn Sina claimed, more certain.
As we have mentioned above that Ibn Sina examines the
necessary existence from metaphysical principles, now he begins
with the statement that primary concepts cannot truly be defined.16
Definition in this sense refers to Aristotelian logic, which is formed
from genus and a specific difference already known. Since the primary
8 See Hamid Fahmy Zarkasyi, “The Nature of God in Aristotle’s Natural Theology”,
Journal of Islamic Thought and Civilization, Tsaqafah, vol.4, no.1 Zulqa’dah 1428, pp. 39-54,
Darussalam Institute of Islamic Studies.
9 Ibn Sina, al-Isharat wa al-Tanbihat, ed. Sualyman Dunya, Dar al-Ma’arif, Cairo,
1958, p.146.
10 Aristotle, Physics, VIII, p.7.
11 Ibid, p.5.
12 Ibid, p.6.
13 Ibid, p.8.
14 Ibid, p. 10.
15 Aristotle, Metaphysics, XII, p. 7.
16 Ibn Sina, Al-Shifa’, p.35. ققلمحا فيرعتلاب عنتملماو نكملماو بجاولا لاح فرعن نا انيلع رسعي دق و 
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concepts like existence and thing are not subsumed under anything
better known, they are not definable.17 The necessary, possible and
impossible are of primary concepts and therefore cannot be defined
and made known in a true sense. But they, in fact, imprinted in soul
in a primary fashion.18
Since the primary concepts are not definable, the definition
constructed by philosophers, in the eye of Ibn Sina, leads to vicious
circle. The possible is defined as either necessary or impossible, and
the necessary is either possible or impossible, while the possible is
either necessary or possible. However, Ibn Sina tries to clarify them
in ostensible definition. The impossible, is that which is not possible
to exist, or that which is necessarily not to be; the necessary is that
which is impossible not to be or not possible not to be. The possible
is that which is not impossible to be or not to be.19 This is the only
possible way to define, but in fact not in Ibn Sina’s standard.
However, although the primary concepts cannot be defined
from anything better known, Ibn Sina find a way to explain to those
who do not have them imprinted in the soul. That is by understanding
the denotation of the words and by directing attention and following
the speaker’s intention.20 Among these three concepts (necessary,
possible and impossible) the priority should be with the necessary. It
is because necessary “signifies certainty of existence”21 and existence
is better known than the non-existence (‘adam) as it is known by
itself, while the non-existence is known, in some way, by existence.
By this way the existence play role like, so to speak, the better known
thing, from which anything else can be described. Accordingly, if
the necessary is signifies certainty, and existence is better known
than non-existence, the Necessary existent by reason of itself is the
final result.
Now from the primary concept of necessary and possible, Ibn
Sina turns to apply them to necessary existent being and possible
existent being. The explication runs as follows: Necessary existent
being is being that when it is assumed not to exist an impossibility
17 Ibid, p. 35.
18 Ibid, p. 28.
19 Ibid, pp. 35-36
20 Ibid, p. 29.  . ام ظافللاا نم اهيلع هب لدي-- هب بهذي و لئاقلا هديري ام يلع اهبنم  
21 Ibid, p. 36. دوجولا دكْات يلع  لدي بجاولا 
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result. The possible existent being is a being that when it is assumed
not to exist or to exist no impossibility will be the results.22 I shall
quote the argument in full.
لامح هنم ضرع دوجوم يرغ ضرف تيم يذلا دوجولما وه دوجولا بجاولا نأ ,  
لامح هنم ضرعي لم دوجوم وأ دوجوم يرغ ضرف تيم يذلا وه دوجولا نكملما نأ و. 
هتاذب نوكي لا دق و هتاذب ابجاو نوكي دق دوجولا بجاولا نأ ثم . وه يذلا امأ  
 رخآ ءيشل لا هتاذل يذلا وهف هتاذب دوجولا بجاو ,ناك ءيش يأ , لامح مزلي  
همدع ضرف نم . سيل امم ئش  عضو ول يذلا وهف هتاذب لا دوجولا بجاولا امأ  
دوجولا بجاو راص وه .23 
The Necessary existence is something that cannot not exist
because of itself and not of anything else, while the possible existence
is something that can become necessary existence because of
something other than itself. Ibn Sina gives the illustration for the
latter category from the combustion that is necessarily existent
because of the occurrence of contact between fire and inflammable
material; and from ‘four’ that is necessarily existent when we assume
two plus two. The logical consequence comes up from the premise
that if there is necessary existence by reason of other then there must
be possible existent by reason of itself. Therefore, the result would
be three categories: a) necessary existence by reason of itself b) the
necessary existence by reason of another and c) the possibly existence
by reason of itself. 24 The necessary existence by reason of itself is the
necessary being in the sense of that which exists through itself and
has its essence the sufficient reason of its existence. The necessary
existence by reason of another is the same as the category of thing
having physical necessity. The latter indicates that Ibn Sina relates
22 Ibn Sina, Kitab al-Najat, ed. Majid Fakhry, (Beirut: Dar al-Afaq al-Jadida, n.d), p.261.
23 Ibid, p. 261
24 From cosmological perspective Nasr put b) and c) under the category of
contingent being (mumkinat). This is divided into two classes: 1) Those that are necessary
in the sense that they could not not be. They are contingent by themselves but receive
from the Necessary Existence the quality of being necessary. These being are substance,
like intelligible and angelic substance. 2) Those that are only contingent, which is composed
bodies of the sublunary region which into being and pass away. See Nasr, S.H. Islamic
Cosmological Doctrine, (Harvard: Thames and Hudson, 1978), p. 199.
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the necessity with the actually existence rather than the necessary
existence. Therefore, it is clear that the necessary actual existent being
can be categorized into two: that which is necessary by virtue of
itself and that which necessary by virtue of another.
The possibly existent does not actually exist unless rendered
necessary by something else; and on the contrary the necessarily
existent is every actually existing thing, including whatever occurs
in the physical, such as combustion, four and the like. The possibly
existent can enter the domain of the actual existence only if a factor
other than itself comes with existence. During the present of this
factor, the existence of the possibly existent being become necessary.
25 In other words, during the time the possible existent actually exists,
its existence is necessary, and during the time it does not exist, its
existence is impossible. However, the necessity and impossibility are
conditioned, that is by the presence or the absence of an external con-
dition which necessitate its existence or nonexistence. The argument
for the determination of necessary, possible and impossible with regard
to its essence is related to that condition. The argument is:
If every being is considered with respect to its essence, it is either
necessary being or not necessary being. If it is necessary, it is eternal
and the necessary existent by virtue of its essence. But, if it is not
necessary it cannot be impossible for it has been determined as being.
If the essence of being is conjoined by a condition (طرش) (that it causes
or not causes exists), it becomes impossible or necessary, but if it is
not conjoined by a condition that it causes or not cause exists, the
third alternative is left, which is the possible (al-mumkin). This possible
being, with respect to its essence, is a thing, which is neither necessary
nor impossible. Therefore, every being is either necessary or possible
being by virtue of its essence.26
Thus necessity and impossibility are conditioned, due not to
thing itself, but to the presence or absence of an external condition
which necessitates its existence or nonexistence. The possible is
determined by its being in isolation from the external condition. Ibn
Taymiyyah denied that the possible is an essence that can be either
existing or non-existing, for if an essence is regarded as non-existing
25 Ibn Sina, Kitab al-Najat, p. 262.
26 Ibn Sina, Al-Isharat, Vol.III, pp. 447-448. Cf. Morwedge, Parviz, Avicenna’
Metaphysics, p. 48.
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it can still be present in the mind, which is called al-wujud al-dhihni.
If the word possible is referred to the real existence there is nothing
in reality which is neither necessary and nor impossible.27 Indeed,
Ibn Rushd also objects Ibn Sina’s idea in attaching the necessity to
the possibly existence.28 Since necessary is already designated as
“signifying the certainty of existence”, to put the necessity to the
possible existence, would, perhaps, blur the degree of certainty in
the Necessary existence being. This is, in fact related to the problem,
whether certain thing has sufficient reason for its existence.
The quotation we have just presented serves the explication of
the determination of existence based on the condition, Ibn Sina in
his al-Syifa’ alternates by examining the sufficiency of existence from
the quiddity. The argument runs as follows: Thing exists because
existence has come to it, and does not exist as non-existence has
come to it. If existence and non-existence come from something else,
that other is the cause. If it does not come from something else it is
determined by something other than itself. All this is because either
the quiddity of the thing is sufficient for determination for existence
and non-existence or not sufficient for it. Now if the quiddity is
sufficient for one of these two attributes (existence and non-existence)
it becomes necessary and it is absurd to be assumed as not necessary.
Now if the quiddity is not sufficient for its existence, but something
else bestows its existence, then its existence comes from the existence
of some other thing different from it and must be its cause.29
So it is clear that the necessity of the possible existence is
attained through a cause and in relation to it; if it is not necessary
while the existence of its cause is necessary, it would be still called
possible. Thus the possibility is determined due to its relation to its
cause. This kind of thing, according to Ibn Sina, requires from the
beginning the existence of some third thing through which its
existence or its non-existence is determined.
What we have just previously discuss is in fact touch the des-
cription of the properties of the primary concepts.30 Ibn Sina analy-
27 Ibn Taymiyyah, Dar’ T’a >rud baina al-Aql wa al-Naql, ed. Rishad Salim, (Mecca:
Jami’a M. Ibn Sa’ud al-Islamiyyah, 1983), vol.III, pp. 344.
28 Ibn Rushd, “Fasl al-Maqal fi ma Bayn al-Hikmah wa al-Shari’ah min al-Ittisal”, in
Kitab Falsafat Ibn Rushd, ed, Mustafa ‘Abd al-Jwad ‘Imran, (Cairo: Maktabah al-Muhammadiyah,
al-Tijariyyah, 1968), pp. 41-42.
29 Ibn Sina, Al-Syifa’, pp. 38-39.
30 Ibid, p. 37.
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zes the properties of the Necessary existence in relation to the cause.
The necessarily existent by reason of itself does not have a cause. If
something has a ‘cause’ for its existence, his existence would be through
that cause and cannot have existence by necessity. And if thing does
not have existence by necessity, when considered in itself apart from
the other, it is not necessary in respect to existence through itself.31
Furthermore, the Necessary Existence cannot be united with
any cause (sabab), for the principle of causality cannot be applied to
Necessary Existence. In other words Necessary existence cannot be
united with something in a “reciprocal union”. The reason, says Ibn
Sina, is that reciprocal relation would risk the application of causality
in It. Each would be prior to the other or posterior to the other and
consequently its being would be conditioned by another being.32
To sum up, ontological principle of Ibn Sina’s concept of Wajib
al-Wujud begins with the a priori proposition that there is existence
( ادوجو انه نأ كش لا ).33 Further, he applies his proposition into the
actually existent being and resulted in two conceivable categories:
Everything that exists is either necessary by reason of itself and
possible by reason of itself or necessary by reason of another. The
first has been established smoothly, but the second render complicates
the degree of necessity in the first. In general, we may infer that Ibn
Sina’s explication is well based on an analysis of actually existent by
reason of itself, rather than an analysis of the necessarily existent by
reason of itself.
Cosmological Principles
Cosmological argument is an argument that begins by recog-
nizing the actual existence of something in the universe. Its premises
are that all natural things are dependent for their existence on
something else, which is God. However, the cosmological proof can
utilize the term necessary being in different sense other than merely
by analyzing concepts. It can establish the proof in the sense that
such a thing has a sufficient reason to exist by itself, because the
cosmological proof tries to establish the existence of God as an
31 Ibid.
32 Morewedge, Metaphysics, pp. 48-49.
33 Ibn Sina, Kitab al-Najat, p. 271.
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uncaused cause.34
The cosmological principle in Ibn Sina’s concept of the
Necessary Existence is marked by the explication of causality to reach
the uncaused cause. In his argument Ibn Sina starts from the
proposition that existence either necessary or possible. If it is necessary
the Necessary existence is proven and that is the goal. But if it is
possible it needs further explanation that the possible stops its
existence in the Necessary existence.35 The analysis is not too much
different from the analysis of movement, which is Aristotelian flavor.
The full argument in al-Isharat is follows:
Every totality formed successively of causes and effects, in which
there is a cause which is not an effect, must have that cause as its
outermost point; because if it were in the middle it would be caused.
Every series (silsila) which comprises causes and effect is finite or
infinite. It is clear that, if it only comprised what is caused, it would
need a cause external to it, to which it would be attached, without
any doubt, by an outermost point. It is clear that, if that series
contained something, which was not an effect that would be an
outermost point and extremity (nihaya). So every series culminates in
the Being necessary by His essence هتاذب دوجولا بجاو .36
So, the Necessary existence being is not the cause within the
series of possible causes or ةنكمم ةلع, for if it is included in it, the necessary
become possible. But if the cause is beyond the series and it is
Necessary existence by virtue of itself, then the possible causes end
in the Necessary existence. In Aristotle’s theology God is depicted as
a final cause, by being an object of desire,37 but the existence by
virtue of itself signifies nothing of Aristotle’s doctrine of causality,
neither external cause nor internal cause. Here Ibn Sina omits all
four causes in Aristotle metaphysics, yet in his further explanation
Ibn Sina’s idea seems to be corresponding to that of Aristotle. When
Ibn Sina placed the Necessary existence as point to which all series
of causes of contingent being attempted to return,38 we know that it
certainly corresponds to Aristotle’s God in His being the object of
desire. Similarly, when Ibn Sina posits that the necessary existence
34 Davidson, Herbert A., Avicenna, p. 167.
35 Ibn Sina, Kitab al-Najat, p. 271.
36 Ibn Sina, al-Isyarat, vol. III, pp. 26-27; Cf. Ibn Sina, Kitab al-Najat, pp. 271-272.
37 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 12.7.1072a, p. 29-34.
38 Morewedge, Ibn Sina Metaphysics, p. 59.
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is the end of causes of contingence essence but beyond the series of
causality of contingence existence,39 we recognize it similar to the
argument of Aristotle’s first Unmoved Mover. If the existence of the
Necessary existence is established from the impossibility of infinite
series of causes in the contingence, the Unmoved Mover is attained
from the impossibility of infinite series of motion.
In his cosmological argument Ibn Sina employs mainly the
principle of causality and the impossibility of infinite regress of
causes. Compared Aristotle’s cosmological argument, Ibn Sina’s major
characteristic is that he establishes the first cause of the universe,
while Aristotle established the first cause of motion. This perhaps is
the consequences of the different approach undertaken by both of
them. Ibn Sina considers the existence in general, whereas Aristotle
examines only a segment of existence, which is motion. However,
Aristotle’s theology is initiated by the search of the concept arche, or
the beginning of everything, but in his final analysis he terminated
in the first mover.
The Nature of the Necessary Existence
One of the most important parts of the concept of the Wajib
al-Wujud is its nature. The first part concerns about the concept of
oneness of the Necessary existence. The Wajib al-Wujud is one for
He cannot be united with any other being or cause. It is because if
His existence is necessarily uncaused, it clearly cannot be linked in
any way to a cause. If on the other hand, His existence is not neces-
sarily uncaused, He obviously cannot be considered as the Necessary
Being in Himself. Ibn Sina goes on to argue that it is impossible to
envisage a genuinely reciprocal relationship either, between God and
something else. If such relationship exists it would risk the application
of causality in Him. Each would be prior to the other or posterior to
the other and consequently its being would be conditioned by
another being.40 The impossibility of the application of causality leads
to the rejection of the multiplicity in the Necessary existence, which
becomes another proof of His oneness. For this Ibn Sina argues that
39 Every series (silsila) ends in the Being whose necessarily exists by virtue of
Himself or His essence (Wajib al-Wujud). See Kitab al-Najat, p. 272; Cf. Al-Isyarat. III, pp.
26-27
40 Morewedge, Metaphysics of Ibn Sina, p. 49.
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although it is composed of many elements, like man’s body consists
of many parts, the Necessary Existence cannot have different kinds
of parts, each standing by itself and forming a unit such as wood
and clay in a house. If Necessary Existence has different kind of parts
it would have to be united with the causes. Necessary Existence cannot
contain different properties, for if it were so, its essence would be
together as parts. If its essence were realized and the properties were
accidental, then they would subsist in the Necessary Existence for
their essence because of another cause, here the Necessary Existence,
would be then receptacle.41
The Necessary existence by reason of itself cannot contain any
part whatsoever, for it is simple in every conceivable way. It is also
not composite or consists of component. It is incorporeal in the sense
that It does not composed of matter and form. It is also indefinable
inasmuch as it is not composed of genus and specific difference.
And it is free from the distinction of essence and existence.42
In addition, Ibn Sina also provides an argument on the oneness
of Necessary existence in the same way as the doctrine of tawhid in
Islam. To him there is no god but Allah, and therefore the Necessary
Existence cannot be more than one. There is only one entity of
Necessary Existence. Without quoting any source Qur’anic source
Ibn Sina tries to argue from philosophical principles: If there are
two entities called Necessary Existence then there would be difference
(fasl) or a distinguishing mark (khassa) for each. Since the Necessary
Existence is universal and the universal cannot have fasl and khassa
then the Necessary Existence cannot be two entities.43
Ibn Sina also depicted the nature of the Necessary Existence as
pure intelligence (‘Aql Mahd).44 This is exactly parallel to Aristotle’s
God who is a thought of thought.45 However, there is a point that
looks problematic in Aristotle’s depiction of God being a thought of
thought, but Ibn Sina attempts to give a solution. To avoid change
and multiplicity in the essence of God, Aristotle depicted the
41 Ibid, p. 53-54
42 Ibn Sina, Kitab al-Najat, p.274-275; Ibn Sina, al-Syifa’, pp. 344-348; Ibn Sina, al-
Isharat, p. 144.
43 Morewedge, Metaphysics of Ibn Sina,, pp.54-55. Cf. Ibn Sina, al-Syifa’, pp. 343, 43,
37; Ibn Sina, al-Isarat, III, 36-41, 116.
44 Ibn Sina, al-Syifa’, vol.2, p. 356.
45 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 12.9.1074b37.
Ibn Sina’s Concept of Wajib al-Wujud 387
Vol. 7, No. 2,  Oktober 2011
Unmoved Mover as the subject and the object of thought. Ibn Sina,
although, in some way, follows Aristotle’s doctrine can prove that
God knew many things without implying the multiplicity in His
essence.46 In his al-Isyarat he puts:
God (Wajib al-Wujud) necessarily knows (or understand) His essence
by His essence… and necessarily knows what comes after Him
inasmuch as He is the cause of what comes after Him and derives its
existence from Him.47
This mean God knew something other than Himself but it does not
imply change in His essence. The reason given for this is that God’s
knowledge is unbounded by time and can therefore know about
things susceptible to change without being changed Himself.48 Here
Ibn Sina gives further argument on how God knows as he says that
“The Necessary Existent knows all things due to Its Universal
knowledge. Nothing whatsoever - be it large or small - is hidden
from His knowledge as has become evident from our discussion”.49
Here the argument implies that God knows only universal
knowledge, but later philosophers and theologians reject this
argument.50 However, the point that Ibn Sina deviates from Aristotle
is that the Necessary existence can know object other than Himself
without having any change in Himself and this is distinct from the
characteristic of Aristotle concept of Unmoved Mover.
Conclusion
What is particular in the concept of Wajib al-Wujud is that Ibn
Sina does not employ the method that starts from the argument of
physics as Aristotle did. With his mere metaphysical approach in
terms of existence, Ibn Sina has successfully traveled a long journey
with shorter time. However, the term Wajib al-Wujud is a key concept
for the explication of the existence of God, but the term itself is not
assumption, but the goal to be investigated. Although Necessary
Existence is only ontological concept it is used in his various way of
46 Morewedge, Metaphysics, pp. 61-62
47 Ibn Sina, al-Isyarat, vol.III, p. 278;
48 Morewedge, Metaphysics, pp.64-66.
49 Ibid, p. 66.
50 See J.G. Flynn, St. Thomas and Avicenna on the Nature of God, Abr- Nahrain,
vol.14 (1973-1974), p. 63.
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proving God’s existence, whether in cosmological argument or other
argument. Interestingly, since all depend on the key concept of
‘necessity’, the proof that begins from the causality does not end in
the First Cause but on Wajib al-Wujud, an end that seems to be
incompatible with the beginning. Be that as it may, the concept of
Wajib al-Wujud is predominantly ontological that dealt with by a
priori, logical necessity, based on an analysis of the concept of God’s
nature in so far as the essence of God in that concept contains sufficient
reason of His existence.[]
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